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THE COST OF LMNG: MARYLAND'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE 
THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION SHORT-CHANGES 
PLAINTIFFS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the earliest days of recorded history the mystery of human 
existence has confounded philosophers, theologians, and every per-
son who finds cause to examine their being. From such contempla-
tion flows a myriad of puzzling questions, as deep and as wide as the 
consciousness allows, begging consideration of when life begins and 
ends, demanding reflection on life itself to determine the value of 
existence. Without doubt, the answers are found individually, deter-
mined against the context of one's own existence, necessarily involv-
ing an evaluation drawing on the socioeconomic, moral, 
philosophical and theological forces that shape the world. Yet, in a 
civilized society, such individual metaphysical contemplation takes 
place within, and is shaped by, a system of laws designed for applica-
tion against the conduct of the masses. 
In the microcosm of medical malpractice tort law, the intersections 
of self-determination with prevailing legal principles present theoreti-
cal dilemmas for courts of law. One such dilemma is whether or not a 
claim for wrongful life is valid. 1 Determination of this issue calls for a 
headfirst dive into a quagmire filled with questions concerning fetal 
rights, surrogate decision-making, and liability for negligent conduct.2 
The social underpinnings associated with a cause of action for wrong-
ful life create a judicial reticence, resulting in a majority view that is 
weakened by a lack of uniformity and a minority view that stretches 
traditional tort theories to extend economic relief, acknowledging the 
burdensome expense of an impaired existence.3 
Absent authority from the United States Supreme Court, states are 
left to develop their own body of jurisprudence in accordance with 
the statutory scheme in place within each jurisdiction, and any rele-
vant common law precedent. This comment examines Maryland's 
treatment of the wrongful life cause of action as addressed by that 
jurisdiction for the first time in Kassama v. Magat. 4 Part II reviews the 
evolution of wrongful life and other related causes of action, the treat-
ment of wrongful life claims in other jurisdictions, and the common 
1. See infra Part ILA. 
2. See infra Part ILA-B. 
3. See infra Part II.B. 
4. 136 Md. App. 637, 767 A.2d 348 (2001), affd, 368 Md. 113, 792 A.2d 1102 
(2002) . 
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law and statutory scheme in place in Maryland. Part III focuses on the 
facts and legal doctrine involved in Kassama v. Magat, analyzes the rel-
evant precedent and statutes, and addresses tort principles applied to 
medical malpractice claims under Maryland law. Part IV of the com-
ment considers the need for post-majority damages, evaluates argu-
ments, for and against recognition of wrongful life claims, and 
concludes that Maryland's refusal to recognize the wrongful life cause 
of action leaves plaintiffs with a theoretical claim, yet no remedy at 
law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview oj Wrongful Life and Related Causes oj Action 
Sounding in medical malpractice tort law,s wrongful life is a cause 
of action brought on behalf of a child plaintiff seeking damages on a 
theory that, but for the negligence6 of a medical provider, the child 
would not have been born.7 This cause of action parallels a more 
widely recognized8 cause of action owned by the patents of a child 
born as a result of the negligence of the medical provider, termed 
wrongful birth.9 The controversy surrounding these claims is that the 
theory for recovery stands on the supposition that the parents would 
rather terminate the pregnancy than run the risk of giving birth to a 
defective child. 10 
Other related causes of action, such as wrongful conception 11 and 
wrongful diagnosis,12 add to the body of jurisprudence that precipi-
tates claims for wrongful lifeP Yet, the United States Supreme 
5. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (NY. 1978). 
6. The negligence giving rise to wrongful life or wrongful birth claims gener-
ally arises from a lack of full disclosure of the various risks associated with 
pregnancy, when such failure deprives the parents of the choice to termi-
nate the pregnancy. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982); 
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (NJ. 1984); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808-
09. 
7. Michael A. Berenson, Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim-The Legal Di-
lemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not To Be, " 64 TuL. L. REv. 
895,897 (1990). 
8. See Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 665, 767 A.2d 348, 363 (2001); 
Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Mass. 1990). 
9. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 228, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (1993); 
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983). 
10. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810. 
11. Id. (explaining that a wrongful conception claim occurs when "parents, one 
of whom has undergone an unsuccessful surgical birth control procedure, 
have sought damages for the birth of an unplanned child"). 
12. Id. at 811 (explaining that a wrongful diagnosis claim occurs when the birth 
of a child is attributable to a "wrongful diagnosis" of an existing pregnancy, 
"resulting in the deprivation of the mother's choice to terminate the preg-
nancy within the permissible time period"). 
13. This comment does not consider wrongful birth, wrongful conception or 
wrongful diagnosis at length. 
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Court's decision in Roe v. Wadel4 provides the impetus for pregnancy 
and birth-related causes of action through the protection of abor-
tion,15 creating an option for parents of would-be birth defective chil-
dren to terminate the pregnancy,16 avoiding considerable financial 
expense and emotional distress. 17 In addition, advancements in ge-
netic counseling enable determination of the likelihood of delivering 
a birth defective child; in utero diagnosis of genetic defects; and the 
potential to treat and correct genetic defects during pregnancy. 18 
Against this backdrop, courts now must confront the validity of the 
wrongful life cause of action. 
B. Split of Authority 
The law of prenatal torts has evolved rapidly since the decision in 
Roe. 19 To date, a significant majority of jurisdictions, twenty-eight 
~tates,20 do not recognize wrongful life as a valid cause of action.21 
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15. Id.; see also Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 134-35, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 
(2002). 
16. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 759 ("Relying on Roe v. Wade . .. the Court found 
that public policy now supports the right of a woman to choose to termi-
nate a pregnancy.") (citations omitted) (discussing Berman v. Allan, 80 NJ. 
421 (1979)); see also Bernadette Kennedy, Comment, The Trend Toward Judi-
cial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UClA L. REv. 473, 490-
91 (1983) (discussing the public policy change resulting from Roe v. Wade). 
17. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 759. 
18. See Thomas A. Warnock, Comment, Scientific Advancements: Will Technology 
Make the Unpopular Wrongful Birth/Life Causes of Action Extinct?, 19 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 173, 184 (2001); see also Susan Jenks, In Utero Gene 
Therapy Is Still a Distant Promise, 91 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 829, 830 (1999). 
19. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 231, 630 A.2d 1145, 1147 (1993); 
Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 665, 767 A.2d 348, 363 (2001); Vi-
carro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, lO (Mass. 1990); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983); see also Berenson, supra note 7, at 897; 
see also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
20. Kassama, 368 Md. at 137, 792 A.2d at 1116 (explaining that eighteen states 
invalidate wrongful life through case law and ten states proscribe the claim 
by statute). 
21. See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 
790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 
1988); Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Kush 
v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 
1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); 
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991); Bruggeman v. 
Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 
2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 
530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); 
Strohmaier v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 332 N.W.2d 432 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Greco 
v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 
(N.H. 1986); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 807; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 
528 (N.C. 1985); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993); Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 
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Over the past twenty years, eight state legislatures acted to proscribe 
wrongful life as a cause of action. 22 Representing the minority, three 
states allow recovery for wrongful life at common law.23 Of the three 
states in the minority, two have enacted legislation acknowledging the 
validity of the wrongful life cause of action.24 
1. Majority View 
Though facially the weight of authority falls heavily against recog-
nizing wrongful life, a more critical examination reveals a majority 
weakened by reliance on flawed public policy considerations due to a 
consistent lack of solid rationale.25 Analysis under the traditional tort 
framework26 primarily challenges proponents of wrongful life claims 
to establish the legitimacy of the elements of causation and dam-
ages.27 Moreover, in the context of wrongful life, the judiciary ac-
knowledges the limitations of applying traditional legal principles to 








S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.w.2d 372 
(Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). 
See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 2000) (enacted 1985); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-12-1-1 (Michie 2001) (adopted 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 
§ 2931 (West 2000) (invalidating wrongful life cause of action when child is 
born healthy); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2001); MINN. 
STAT. § 145.424 (West 2000) (effective 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 
(West 2000) (enacted 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (2001) (adopted 
1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305(B) (West 2001) (effective 1988); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAws § 21-55-1 (Michie 2001) (effective 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-11-24 (2001) (adopted 1983). 
See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 960; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 
486. 
In 1981, California enacted section 43.6 of its civil code, which bars a cause 
of action against a parent for wrongful life. Additionally, the statute denies 
the failure to prevent the live birth of a child as a defense against third 
parties, and from consideration in damage awards. CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.6 
(West 2001). The Turpin court noted that the purpose of the legislation was 
to "eliminate any liability or other similar economic pressure which might 
induce potential parents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defec-
tive child." Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959. In the state of Washington, though not 
expressly addressed by statute, the validity of the wrongful life cause of ac-
tion at common law is acknowledged in the annotations of its revised code. 
Such sections include; section 7.70.040, which outlines the elements 
needed to prove injury resulting from a breach of the duty of care, section 
7.70.050, which addresses elements of proof in an action for lack of in-
formed consent, and section 4.24.290, which codifies the standard of proof 
in an action for damages on a theory of professional negligence. 
See supra note 2l. 
See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 811. Duty, breach, causation and injury comprise 
the elements of the traditional tort framework utilized by the courts sur-
veyed. Id. 
See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810. Noting that: 
It borders on the absurdly obvious to observe that resolution of 
[the wrongful life] question transcends the mechanical application 
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Jurisdictions adopting the majority position point to three areas of 
weakness within the tort framework of a plaintiff's cause of action for 
wrongful life. Varied in accordance with each state's own common 
law,29 courts place weight on lack of causation,30 absence of a legal 
injury,3] and the impossibility of calculating damages,32 individually or 
in combination, to invalidate wrongful life as a cause of action.33 
The interdependence of the elements involved in the tort frame-
work blurs analysis when applied to wrongful life causes of action. 
Stymied by the weakness of theoretical injuries,34 some courts stop 
short of contemplating damages, resting on the lack of causation as 
the basis for invalidating the plaintiff's cause of action.35 These juris-
dictions acknowledge the existence of the child as a result of the phy-
sician's negligence only inasmuch as the parents' wrongful birth claim 
is concerned.36 Analysis of the child's claim, however, shifts scrutiny 
to the cause of the child's impairment, not the child's existence.37 
Whereas in a claim for wrongful birth, parents may recover for the 











of legal principles. Any such resolution, whatever it may be, must 
invariably be colored by notions of public policy, the validity of 
which remains, as always, a matter upon which reasonable men 
may disagree. 
See Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 1022-23; Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 682-84 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758-60. 
See Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329 ("The condition was caused not by another, but 
by natural processes.") (emphasis omitted); see also Garrison, 581 A.2d at 
288; James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985). 
See Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 548; Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990); 
Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1210; Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293; Blake, 698 P.2d at 322; 
Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 700; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 
1024-25; Smith, 513 A.2d at 355; Flanagan, 623 N.E.2d at 191; Nelson, 678 
S.w.2d at 925; Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 290. 
Strohmaier, 332 N.W.2d at 435; Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 743 (quoting Martin A. 
Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 
14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 40 (1980), and Thomas Rogers III, Wrongful Life and 
Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 
33 S.C. L. REv. 713, 729-30 (1982»; Greco, 893 P.2d at 347; Becker, 386 
N.E.2d at 807; Dumer, 233 N.W.2d at 376. 
See Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293-94; James G. v. Coserta, 332 S.E.2d 872,879-81 
(W. Va. 1985). 
Garrison, 581 A.2d at 294 ("We concur with the view that the question of 
whether it would have been better for an impaired child to never have lived 
at all is a philosophical one not amenable to judicial resolution."). 
[d. at 293 ("There may be a causal link between defendants' negligence and 
the child's existence, but not between that negligence and her impaired 
condition."); Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329 ("The condition ... was inflicted upon 
the plaintiff not by any person, but by the plaintiff's genetic constitu-
tion .... The condition was caused not lJy another, but by natural processes."). 
For wrongful birth, the cause of injury is the doctor's negligence that strips 
the parents of their right to choose, thereby causing the child to come into 
existence. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 899; see also Garrison, 581 A.2d at 
290; Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329-30. 
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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injury stems from the negligence of the physician; jurisdictions not 
recognizing wrongful life, however, create an illogical scenario in 
which a child may not recover on the same facts as her parents. Thus, 
the two claims are distinguished more so on damages than 
causation.38 
A more solid rationale employed by many jurisdictions invalidates 
wrongful life due to the absence of a legally cognizable injury.39 Most 
courts do not acknowledge a legal right to be born.40 Thus, those 
courts hold that without a right to be born, the child cannot suffer an 
injury from birthY This syllogism bears out the child's inability to 
"prove injury at the hands of the doctor," by recognizing that 
"[c]hildren ... have neither the ability nor the right to determine 
questions of conception, termination of gestation, or carrying to 
term."42 The strength of this position flows from the theoretical in-
ability to recognize a right to be born without invading upon, or inval-
idating, a mother's autonomy in determining reproductive matters.43 
True examination of the issue, however, cannot stop here. Due to 
advancements in medicine and the corresponding rise in the standard 
of care owed to patients, once born, a right to access the courts inures 
in the child, thus enabling a child plaintiff to take action against a 
negligent tortfeasor. 44 Such is the case in Maryland, where claims by 
minor plaintiffs arising from birth-related matters are recognizable at 
common law.45 
The theoretical undoing of the wrongful life cause of action within 
the traditional tort framework culminates in the inability of courts to 
adequately determine the amount of damage incurred.46 At bottom, 
the plaintiff's claim is premised on the assertion that, but for the doc-
tor's negligence, the child would not have been born and therein 
would not "experience the pain and suffering attributable to" life with 
38. See Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
39. See supra note 31. 
40. Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 289. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(implying no right to be born). 
41. Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 289. 
42. Walker, 790 P.2d at, 740 (Ariz. 1990). 
43. See Hon. George A. Brown, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort-An Introduction, 
15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 445, 447 (1981) (discussing conflict and confusion 
between claims for wrongful life and wrongful birth). Legal theory pre-
cludes the concurrent recognition of both a right to be born and a right to 
an abortion. For, if a right to be born is recognized, and a pregnancy is 
aborted, a legal wrong occurs for which a cause of action inures in the 
unborn child. 
44. See Damasiecwicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1951). 
45. See Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113,134,792 A.2d 1102, 1114 (2002); see also 
Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 119,453 A.2d 1198, 1207 
(1983); State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 184, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); 
Damasiecwicz, 197 Md. at 439, 79 A.2d at 560. 
46. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812. 
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the genetic defect.47 Thus, the determination of an award "demands 
a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the 
Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence."48 
At this point, some courts find themselves afloat in a tumultuous sea 
of countervailing policy considerations that motivate the judiciary to 
abandon the search for a legal remedy, deferring resolution of the 
matter to the legislature.49 Foremost in the mind of the judiciary 
seems to be the public policy supporting the preciousness of human 
life. 50 The sanctity of life argument packages the notion that life, in 
any condition or form, holds intrinsic value.51 Other policy considera-
tions include the public perception, sensitivity to and treatment of de-
fective humans,52 as well as line-drawing considerations.53 
2. Minority View 
At least three states, California, Washington and New Jersey, have 
recognized wrongful life as a valid cause of action, albeit in a limited 
form.54 These jurisdictions modify the tort analysis, only allowing re-
47. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 638 (Kan. 1986). 
48. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812. 
49. See, e.g., Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So. 
2d at 1025. 
50. Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 639-40 ("Basic to our culture is the precept that life 
is precious. As a society, therefore, our laws have as their driving force the 
purpose of protecting, preserving and improving the quality of human exis-
tence.") (quoting Blake, 698 P.2d at 322). 
51. See Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 640 ("life - whether experienced with or without 
a major physical handicap - is more precious than non-life") (quoting 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8,12 (NJ. 1979»; see also Flanagan, 623 N.E.2d 
at 191. 
52. See Smith, 513 A.2d at 353 (quoting Geoffrey D. Minnot & Vincent P. 
Zurzolo, Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
447,459-60 (1981) (footnotes omitted». The court noted: 
[Disabled persons] also face subtle yet equally devastating handi-
caps in the attitudes and behavior of society, the law, and their own 
families and friends. Furthermore, society often views disabled per-
sons as burdensome misfits. Recent legislation concerning employ-
ment, education, and building access reflects a slow change in 
these attitudes. This change evidences a growing public awareness 
that the handicapped can be valuable and productive members of 
society. 
Smith, 513 A.2d at 353. 
53. In Siemieniec, the court noted: 
Judges and juries will have to determine the degree of impairment 
that renders a child's nonexistence preferable to existence. Not 
only will such a judgment be unpalatable, but persons making this 
judgment can look only to their own feelings or fears of being 
handicapped in deciding the merits of the claim. 
Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 699-700. 
54. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 954; see also Procanik, 478 A.2d at 755; Harbeson v. 
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983). 
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covery of special damages related to the extraordinary cost of medical 
care attributable to the malady. 55 
Adherence to the core principles of tort law enables the minority 
jurisdictions to rebut the policy considerations to which the majority 
of jurisdictions ultimately succumbed. 56 The wrongful life cause of 
action flows from the acceptance at common law of the premise that 
the duty of care owed by a physician extends to the fetus.57 In assess-
ing the existence of a legal injury and the extent of damages, a minor-
ity of courts agree with the premise underlying the majority's denial of 
the cause of action, that "measuring the value of an impaired life as 
compared to nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals, whether 
judges or jurors."58 Yet, the minority courts each determine that the 
inability to assess general damages is not fatal. 59 Thus, the minority 
allows the plaintiff child to recover only those special damages attribu-
table to the extraordinary cost of her affliction.60 Special damages are 
quantifiable61 and allow the courts to vindicate the "dual objectives of 
[the] tort system: the compensation of injured parties and the deter-
rence of future wrongful conduct."62 Furthermore, these courts limit 
the recovery of such damages to a single plaintiff,63 acknowledging 
the possibility that the child's parents mayor may not be available to 
recover for pre-majority damages.64 
C. Maryland Common Law Recognizes Wrongful Conception and Wrongful 
Birth Claims 
The common law landscape in Maryland includes prenatal tort 
claims for wrongful conception65 and wrongful birth.66 Critical analy-
55. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 966; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 757; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 497. 
56. See Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965-66; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495-96. 
57. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760 ("[TJhe defendant doctors do not deny they owed 
a duty to the infant plaintiff, and we find such a duty exists."); Harbeson, 656 
P.2d at 495 ("Prenatal injuries to a fetus have been recognized as actionable 
in this state for 20 years .... We now hold ... a duty may extend to persons 
not yet conceived .... "); see also Turyin, 643 P.2d at 960. 
58. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496. 
59. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 963 (addressing the extent of damages from a practical 
standpoint, by denying only general damages due to the impossibility to 
rationally determine if a child indeed suffered an injury in being born im-
paired instead of not being born at all, and due to the lack of "any fair, 
nonspeculative" method of calculating general damages); Procanik, 478 
A.2d at 763 (focusing solely on the "needs of the living" instead of being 
stymied by the "philosophical problem of finding that such a defective life 
is worth less than no life at all"); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496. 
60. See Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 
496-97. 
61. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762. 
62. [d. at 764. 
63. See id. at 762. 
64. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762. 
65. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
66. Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993). 
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sis of the evolution of these related causes of action in Maryland 
reveals tort principles and policy considerations relied upon by the 
judiciary.67 . 
l. Prenatal Injuries 
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch marks the genesis of the common law regard-
ing prenatal injuries in Maryland.68 In that case, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that a child injured prior to birth may maintain an 
action for damages against the negligent party.69 To arrive at this de-
cision, the court studied the early common law of England and Ire-
land regarding the right to inherit legal claims, and whether or not 
legal rights inure in unborn children for the purposes of tort actions, 
and if so, at what point.70 The court then turned to a survey of similar 
claims adjudicated in other jurisdictions within the United States.71 
Confronted with authority on either side, the court categorized the 
cases as adhering to either the position implied by Lord Coke or an 
alternate stance that relies on advances in medical science and gen-
eral knowledge. The first position acknowledges the inheritance of 
legal rights in children after birth, while the latter uses medical science 
and general knowledge in determining a prenatal right of action.72 
Before determining the issue, the court dismissed lesser arguments 
attacking recognition of a child's legal claim for prenatal injuries on 
the basis that medical science will divine baseless claims from the legit-
imate, and will necessarily weigh on the ability of plaintiffs to prove 
their claim. 73 Breaking free from an antiquated majority position,14 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland approached the issue in terms of 
rights; accepting the argument that the "child does not continue until 
birth to be a part of its mother," and as such has independent rights, 
inuring upon viability and exercisable at birth.75 Thus, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, reversing the trial court, held that a child has 
the right to sue for injuries suffered prior to birth.76 
2. Wrongful Conception 
In Jones v. Malinowski, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized 
a cause of action for the parents of a healthy child born as the result 
67. See Reed, 332 Md. at 232-35, 630 A.2d at 1148; Jones, 299 Md. at 263-70, 473 
A.2d at 432-35. 
68. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951). 
69. See id. at 435-41, 79 A.2d at 557-61. 
70. Id. at 419-25, 79 A.2d at 550-53. 
71. Id. at 425-36, 79 A.2d at 553-58. 
72. See id. at 436-37, 79 A.2d at 559. 
73. See id. at 437, 79 A.2d at 559. 
74. See Damasiewicz, 197 Md. at 440, 79 A.2d at 560. 
75. Id. at 441, 79 A.2d at 561. 
76. See id. 
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of a negligently performed sterilization procedure.77 In so holding, 
the court surveyed existing precedent in jurisdictions representing 
both the majority7s and minority79 positions relative to the issue of 
"whether the cause of action encompasses damages for the costs of 
rearing the unplanned but healthy child to majority."so Thereafter, 
the court examined applicable medical malpractice tort principles in 
Maryland and the attendant policy considerations,s1 before adopting 
the minority position,s2 allowing parents to recover damages for child 
rearing costs through the age of majority, offset by the benefit derived 
from the child's aid, society and comfort.s3 
3. Wrongful Birth 
Building on the principles used in Jones, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland recognized a parent's cause of action for wrongful birth in 
Reed v. Campagnolo.S4 As in Jones, the court analyzed each element of 
the tort framework, reasoning from the jurisdiction's common law 
and applicable statutes.S5 In considering the existence of a legal in-
jury, the court relied upon precedent from prevailing jurisdictions, 
bearing out competing policy arguments.S6 Furthermore, the court's 
77. Jones, 299 Md. at 263,473 A.2d at 432. Mr. and Mrs. Malinowski had three 
children, one by breech birth, the second born with a brain disease, and 
the third born with a heart disease. Id. at 260, 473 A.2d at 430. Motivated 
by financial difficulties and the trauma the couple experienced with child-
birth, Mrs. Malinowski underwent a sterilization procedure called bipolar 
tubal laparoscopy. Id. During the procedure, the physician cauterized the 
wrong tissue, failing to block one of the Fallopian tubes. Id. Thus, the pro-
cedure was ineffective. Id. Mrs. Malinowski became pregnant a fourth time, 
delivering a healthy child. Id. 
78. Id. at 263-65, 473 A.2d at 432-33. 
79. Id. at 265-68, 473 A.2d at 433-34. 
80. Id. at 263, 473 A.2d at 432. 
81. Id. at 268-71, 473 A.2d at 435-36. 
82. Id. at 270,473 A.2d at 435. 
83. Jones, 299 Md. at 270,473 A.2d at 435. See id. at 272-74,473 A.2d at 436-37, 
for a discussion of the assessment of damages for child rearing costs offset 
by the benefits rule. 
84. 332 Md. 226, 240, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (1993). The Reeds were not in-
formed by their medical provider of the "existence or need for routine [al-
pha-fetoprotein] ("AFP") testing" as a part of prenatal care. Id. at 229, 630 
A.2d at 1146. The Reeds' child was born with spina bifida and other ge-
netic abnormalities, which an AFP test would have detected. Id. at 229-30, 
630 A.2d at 1146-47. Consequently, the Reeds were stripped of their ability 
to choose to terminate the pregnancy. Id. 
85. Id. at 232-40, 630 A.2d at 1148-52. 
86. Id. at 235-39, 630 A.2d at 1149-51. When the court decided the issue of 
whether to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, the prevailing 
arguments concerning the existence of a legal injury considered the eco-
nomic impact of delivering and raising a child, healthy or not, on one side, 
against the notion that life, under any circumstance, cannot be considered 
a legal injury, on the other side. Id. 
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broad view of proximate cause contributed to the validity of wrongful 
birth claims in Maryland.87 
D. Arguments Supported by the Statutory Scheme in Maryland 
The statutory scheme and supporting common law in Maryland 
provide a basis for recognizing wrongful life as a valid cause of ac-
tion.88 Section 20-209 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland 
Code codifies Maryland's abortion law, a liberal statute89 that does not 
provide a time limitation for terminating a pregnancy if the fetus suf-
fers from a "genetic defect or serious deformity or abnormality."90 
Also relevant to the validity of wrongful life is the statutory obligation 
imposed on the parents of destitute adult children to provide "food, 
shelter, care and clothing,"91 an obligation enforceable by criminal 
sanctions.92 Beyond these statutory obligations, however, the com-
mon law does not extend primary responsibility for the adult child's 
medical expenses to the parent.93 
87. Id. at 239-40, 630 A.2d 1151-52. The court relied upon a substantial factor 
analysis of legal cause. See id. at 240, 630 A.2d at 1152; see also Kassama, 136 
Md. App. at 658-63, 767 A.2d at 359-62 (discussing the issue of proximate 
cause). 
88. See infra notes 90-104, 153-54 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. 
A-B. 
89. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 646, 767 A.2d at 353. 
90. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209(b)(2)(ii) (2001). The pertinent 
language reads: 
Id. 
(b) State inteIVention.-Except as otherwise provided in this subti-
tle, the State may not interfere with the decision of a woman to 
terminate a pregnancy: 
(1) Before the fetus is viable; or 
(2) At any time during the woman's pregnancy, if: 
(i) The termination procedure is necessary to protect the 
life or health of the woman; or 
(ii) The fetus is affected by genetic defect or serious de-
formity or abnormality. 
91. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (1999). The statute reads: 
Id. 
(b) Duty to support destitute adult child.-If a destitute adult child is 
in this State and has a parent who has or is able to earn suffi-
cient means, the parent may not neglect or refuse to provide 
the destitute adult child with food, shelter, care, and clothing. 
92. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(c) (1999 & Supp. 2002). The statute 
reads: 
Id. 
(c) Penalties.-A person who violates any provision of this section is 
. guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine 
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year, 
or both. 
93. See Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., III Md. App. 49, 70-71, 680 A.2d 532, 
542-43 (1996), affd, 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d 1358 (1997) (stating that "par-
ents do not ... have the primary responsibility for post-majority medical ex-
penses of their children .... Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article 
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Significant to the argument in favor of recognizing wrongful life is 
the judicial interpretation of Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Arti-
cle in Pepper-v. Johns Hopkins Hospital. 94 Pepper involved a medical mal-
practice claim brought by a minor patient seeking, among other 
things, to recover post-majority damages from a negligent medical 
care provider.95 Reasoning from their decision in Presley v. Presley96 
and their interpretation of Section 13-102(b),97 the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland noted that parents are not "primarily liable for 
the medical expenses of an adult child."98 The court's rationale relied 
upon the ability of the tort system to vindicate the otherwise illogical 
result that holds the potential to bankrupt a family due to their statu-
torily imposed responsibility for the expenses incurred by the incapac-
itated adult child due to "the negligence of a solvent third party."99 
Furthermore, section 13-102(b) does not give rise to a cause of action 








places upon an adult child's parents a contingent responsibility for the 
adult child's medical expenses if the adult child is destitute and cannot pay 
them"). For a comprehensive history of the common law enforcement of 
Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article, see Freeburgerv. Bichell, 135 Md. 
App. 680, 763 A.2d 1226 (2000) (concluding that the parent of an injured 
adult child did not establish that he was under a legal obligation to provide 
for his son's medical care). 
III Md. App. at 70-72,680 A.2d 542-43. 
See id. at 56-60, 680 A.2d at 535-37. For a specific discussion regarding the 
claim for post-majority medical expenses, see id. at 70-73, 650 A.2d at 542-
44. 
65 Md. App. 265, 277-78, 500 A.2d 322, 328 (1985) ("The duty of support 
arises when the child has insufficient resources and, because of mental or 
physical infirmity, insufficient income capacity to enable him to meet his 
reasonable living expenses. "). 
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
Pepper, III Md. App. at 71-72,680 A.2d at 543. The court noted that "[a]n 
adult child is primarily liable for his or her own medical expenses." [d. at 
70, 680 A.2d at 542. In the case of a destitute adult child, however, Section 
13-102(b) of the Family Law Article requires an adult child's parents to pay 
medieal expenses if the adult is unable to pay. [d. at 71, 680 A.2d at 543. 
[d. at 71-72, 680 A.2d at 543. The court stated: 
Furthermore, the contingent responsibility would not normally be 
expected to come into play if injury is caused by the negligence of a 
solvent third party and if the tort system works as it should. Tort 
recovery is designed, inter alia, to prevent an injured party from 
becoming destitute and a burden upon innocent third parties. 
[d. at 71,680 A.2d at 543; see also Hale v. State, 44 Md. App. 376, 378-79, 408 
A.2d 772, 772-73 (1979) (holding that an adult child is liable under Article 
27, section 104 only if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the par-
ent was destitute, and that the adult child was "able to earn means suffi-
cient" to support the parent); see also Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 
611,479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (holding that a parent with the means to 
do so, must support a destitute adult child whose disability commenced 
after the age of majority). 
Freeburger v. Biehell, 135 Md. App. 680, 682-83, 763 A.2d 1226, 1227 
(2000) (involving a suit brought by the father of a destitute, disabled, adult 
child against the tortfeasor responsible for the adult child's injuries). 
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of Pepper clearly supports a cause of action that would enable a plain-
tiff child to recover for the extraordinary cost of medical care attend-
ant with the injury suffered at the hands of a negligent medical 
provider. IOI Reading Maryland's abortion law102 in co~unction with 
section 13-102(b) and the supporting case law,103 a theory that would 
enable a plaintiff child to recover post-majority damages to compen-
sate for the extraordinary expense of medical care and maintenance 
concomitant with her existence, a condition proximately caused by 
the negligence of the medical provider,I04 becomes reasonable. 
III. KASSAMA v. MAGAT: BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Facts of Kassam a v. Magat 
As a matter of first impression,105 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland addressed a wrongful life claim brought by Milicent Kas-
sarna ("Mrs. Kassama") on behalf of her daughter, Ibrion.106 At the 
same time, Mrs. Kassama brought her own claim for wrongful birth. 107 
Both causes of action were based on negligence and lack of informed 
consent. lOB 
The facts giving rise to the litigation remained unsettled at trial, as 
Mrs. Kassama and Dr. Magat disagreed as to the timing of critical 
events. 109 According to Dr. Magat, Mrs. Kassama's obstetrician-gyne-
cologist, Mrs. Kassama's initial appointment was April 19, 1995, at 
which time an ultrasound test was performed revealing the age of her 
fetus as seventeen weeks, four days.110 As such, Mrs. Kassama was 
noted in the file as a "late registrant."l1l During the initial visit, Dr. 
Magat "ordered blood work, including an AFP test." 11 2 Mrs. Kassama 













Pepper, III Md. App. at 71, 680 A.2d at 543. 
Supra note 90. 
See supra notes 91, 93-100 and accompanying text. 
In wrongful life claims, the injury complained of is life itself. See supra notes 
5-7, 46-48 and accompanying text. 
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 641, 767 A.2d at 350. 
Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351. 
See id. 
Id. at 642-43, 767 A.2d at 35l. 
See id. at 646-52, 767 A.2d at 353-56. 
Id. at 646-47, 767 A.2d at 353. 
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353. 
Id. at 646-47, 767 A.2d at 353. Alpha-fetoprotein "increases in maternal 
blood during pregnancy and, when detected by amniocentesis, is an impor-
tant indicator of open neural tube defects .... " STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIe. 
TIONARY 637 (26th ed. 1995). An AFP test is a method of detecting the 
potential for genetic defects in a fetus. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 644, 767 
A.2d at 352. The test involves drawing and analyzing blood drawn from the 
mother, generally fifteen to sixteen weeks into her pregnancy but as late as 
nineteen weeks, to determine the level of alpha fetoprotein present. Id. 
Unusually low scores are indicative of Down's syndrome. Id. 
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the doctor's office where a blood sample would be drawn and ana-
lyzed. II3 Dr. Magat explained the purpose of the AFP test, when the 
test should be performed, and discussed screenings for other poten-
tial maladies.114 Dr. Magat told her to have the tests performed "as 
soon as possible" and dated the requisition slip April 20, 1995, as he 
expected the tests to be performed the next dayYs Mrs. Kassama was 
given two additional slips, one of which was to be used for an official 
ultrasound. I 16 
Mrs. Kassama's next visit with Dr. Magat was May 18, 1995Y7 Dur-
ing the appointment, she told the doctor that the blood for the AFP 
test was drawn May 16, 1995, prompting Dr. Magat to note on her 
chart that the patient was "non-compliant."118 The lab results were 
summarized in a report, which Dr. Magat reviewed on May 25, 
1995.119 According to Dr. Magat, he then informed Mrs. Kassama by 
phone that the test results indicated that she "had a one in fIfty-seven 
chance of delivering a baby with Down's syndrome."120 At the time of 
Dr. Magat's call, the gestational age of the fetus was twenty-two weeks, 
four days.121 
Evidence at trial established that no doctor in Maryland would per-
form an abortion of a fetus with Down's syndrome beyond twenty-
three weeks, six days.122 However, because AFP tests are not defIni-
tive, amniocentesis was needed.123 Dr. Magat testifIed that during a 
phone conversation on May 25th, he told Mrs. Kassama that by the 
113. Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353. 
114. Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 354. 
115. Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353. 
116. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353-54. 
117. Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 354. 
118. Id. at 647-48, 767 A.2d at 354. 
119. Id. at 648, 767 A.2d at 354. 
120. Id. at 648-49, 767 A.2d at 354. Down's syndrome is defined as: 
[A] chromosomal dysgenesis syndrome consisting of a variable con-
stellation of abnormalities caused by triplication or translocation of 
chromosome 21. The abnormalities include mental retardation, 
retarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short nose, prominent 
epicanthic skin folds, small low-set ears with prominent antihelix, 
fissured and thickened tongue, laxness of joint ligaments, pelvic 
dysplasia, broad hands and feet, stubby fingers, and transverse pal-
mar crease. Lenticular opacities and heart disease are common. 
The incidence of leukemia is increased and Alzheimer's disease is 
almost inevitable by age 40. 
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1728 (26th ed. 1995). 
121. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 648, 767 A.2d at 354. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 644-45, 767 A.2d at 352. Amniocentesis is defined as 
"[t]ransabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac." STEDMAN'S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 62 (26th ed. 1995). Amniocentesis is a test conducted 
to determine, with certainty, the genetic profile of a fetus. Kassama, 136 
Md. App. at 644-45, 767 A.2d at 352. The test is usually performed subse-
quent to an AFP test that indicates an increased likelihood of genetic de-
fects in the fetus. Id. Test results enable parents to adequately plan for or 
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time an amniocentesis could have been performed, and the results 
obtained, there would be insufficient time to schedule and perform 
an abortion in Maryland. 124 Dr. Magat also testified that he informed 
Mrs. Kassama of her option to obtain an abortion in other states. 125 
Contrary to Dr. Magat's testimony, Mrs. Kassama testified that she 
followed Dr. Magat's directions, undergoing an ultrasound on May 11, 
1995, and having blood drawn May 16, 1995.126 Furthermore, Mrs. 
Kassama testified that the phone conversation on May 25th never hap-
pened, and that she was not informed of the AFP test results, the op-
tion of performing an amniocentesis, or an abortion.127 Mrs. Kassama 
further testified that had she been properly informed, she would have 
obtained an amniocentesis, and if she had been certain that her fetus 
had Down's syndrome, she would have obtained an abortion in Mary-
land or elsewhere.128 Ibrion was born September 19, 1995, afflicted 
with Down's syndrome.129 Mrs. Kassama then filed suit in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore County against Dr. Magat. 130 
B. Issues Presented by Kassama 
Prior to trial, the defendant was granted partial summary judgment 
as to Ibrion Kassama's claim of lack of informed consent.131 At the 
close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant's motion for judgment was 
granted as to Ibrion's claim of negligence and Mrs. Kassama's claim of 
lack of informed consent, leaving only the mother's wrongful birth 
claim for the jury. 132 The jury determined that Dr. Magat had 
breached the standard of care, and was, therefore, the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Kassama's injury.133 The jury also determined, however, 
that Mrs. Kassama was also negligent for her injury,134 and as such, 
Mrs. Kassama's claim failed because Maryland courts bar recovery 
when contributory negligence is present. 135 
prevent the birth of a genetically defective child. Id. at 645, 767 A.2d at 
357. 
124. See id. at 649, 767 A.2d at 354-55. 
125. Id. Women can get an abortion in New York up to twenty-six weeks of ges-
tational age and, for a Down's syndrome fetus, up to twenty-eight weeks in 
Kansas. Id. at 650, 767 A.2d at 355. Testimony indicated Arkansas as an 
out-of-state alternative, as well. See Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 120, 792 
A.2d 1102, 1106 (2002). 
126. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647-48, 652, 767 A.2d at 354, 356. 
127. Id. at 652, 767 A.2d at 356. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 642, 767 A.2d at 351. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351. 
132. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 643, 767 A.2d at 35l. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See id. at 657, 767 A.2d at 359 (quoting Batten v. Michel, 15 Md. App. 646, 
652, 292 A.2d 707, 711 (1972»; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs of Garret 
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On appeal, Mrs. Kassama raised several issues with respect to her 
and lbrion's claims. 136 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ad-
dressed three of those issues: whether or not the trial court committed 
error by allowing the jury to decide the issue of Mrs. Kassama's con-
tributory negligence; if not, whether the trial court committed error 
by not instructing the jury as to the last clear chance doctrine; and 
whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for 
judgment as to the plaintiff's wrongful life claim.137 The trial court 
was affirmed on all three issues. 138 Not persuaded by the minority 
position,139 the appellate court did not recognize the wrongful life 
claim due to the impossibility of calculating damages. 14o 
C. Relevant Maryland Precedent 
Due to the novelty of the wrongful life cause of action, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, when deciding Kassama, relied heavily 
on persuasive primary authority and secondary sources. 141 However, 
except for an introductory reference to the jurisdiction's recognition 
of wrongful birth claims in Reed v. Campagnolo, the court did not con-
sider any Maryland cases in the disposition of the wrongful life is-
sue. 142 Furthermore, the court's sole statutory consideration focused 
on Maryland's abortion law.143 
County Md. v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 180,695 A.2d 171, 181 
(1997) (discussing the doctrine of contributory negligence). 
136. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351-52. 
137. Id. at 643-44, 767 A.2d at 351-52. The court did not address three of the 
questions presented by appellant. See id. The declined questions were: 
1. Did the trial court err in excluding any evidence as to post-
majority damages? . 
2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that any damages 
suffered by Mrs. Kassama were to be offset by any non-eco-. 
nomic benefit she suffered as a result of the birth of her 
daughter? 
3. Did the trial court err in allowing evidence of the availability of 
public services in contravention of the collateral source rule? 
Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 352 n.5. 
138. Id. at 644, 767 A.2d at 352. 
139. See supra Part II.B.2. 
140. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 675, 767 A.2d at 369. 
141. See id. at 665-75, 767 A.2d at 363-69. The court began its analysis of the 
wrongful life cause of action by providing an overview of traditional tort law 
drawn from relevant scholarly writings. Id. at 665-66, 767 A.2d at 363-64. 
The court then continued with an examination of the wrongful life cause of 
action within the tort framework as demonstrated through precedent-set-
ting cases from foreign jurisdictions. Id. at 666-68, 767 A.2d at 364-65. A 
comprehensive survey of those jurisdictions that have addressed wrongful 
life, including the majority and minority jurisdictions as well as those states 
that have legislated to prohibit the cause of action, followed. Id. at 668-75, 
767 A.2d at 365-69. 
142. Id. at 665, 767 A.2d at 363. 
143. Id. at 646, 767 A.2d at 353; see supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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The court reviewed the prevailing rationale that disqualifies wrong-
ful life claims premised on the absence of a legal injury,144 and the 
impossibility of calculating damages,145 as well as arguments premised 
on public policy considerations. 146 The court dismissed as flawed, the 
minority position that limits recovery under wrongful life claims to 
special damages. 147 Instead, the court, in a footnote, suggested that a 
parent, through a wrongful birth cause of action, more properly will 
recover damages under wrongful life, and if not, the state should sup-
port the minor.148 Yet, this suggestion runs counter to the statutory 
scheme advanced in Presley v. Presley149 and Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hos-
pital,150 a line of reasoning that was not discussed by the Kassama 
court. 151 
D. Tort Principles as Applied to Medical Malpractice Claims in Maryland 
Ultimately, recognition of prenatal torts relies on the satisfaction of 
the elements of the traditional tort framework as applied to medical 
malpractice claims in Maryland.152 Consistency in the analysis of med-
ical malpractice claims is crucial to the strength and validity of the 











Id. at 666-67, 767 A.2d at 364. The court discussed Ellis v Sherman, 515 
A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986), in which a wrongful life claim was rejected due to the 
inability of the plaintiff to prove an injury. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 666, 
767 A.2d at 364. The Ellis court noted, "the condition was caused not by 
another, but by natural processes. It is not, therefore a legal injury." Id. at 
667,767 A.2d at 364 (quoting Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329). 
Id. at 667, 767 A.2d at 364. The court agreed with the reasoning of Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978), that a comparison between an im-
paired life and nonexistence places the calculation of damages outside the 
ability of the judiciary, thereby frustrating tort principles designed to "put 
the victim ... in the position that he would have been in if the defendant 
had not been negligent." Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 667-68, 767 A.2d at 364-
65. 
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 669, 767 A.2d at 365. The court noted certain 
jurisdictions that reject the wrongful life cause of action due to the 
"preciousness of human life." Id. 
Id. at 672-73, 767 A.2d at 367. The court was unimpressed by the inability 
of California, Washington and New Jersey to explain the process that de-
nies general damages yet allows special damages. Id. at 675, 767 A.2d at 
369. 
Id. at 673 n.19, 767 A.2d at 368 n.19. 
65 Md. App. 265, 500 A.2d 322 (1985); see supra note 96 and accompanying 
text. 
III Md. App. 49, 680 A.2d 532 (1996); see supra notes 94-100 and accompa-
nying text. 
See generally Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 637, 767 A.2d at 348. 
Id. at 673, 767 A.2d at 367-68; see also Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 546-
49,525 A.2d 643,648-50 (1987); Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 
616,621-22,258 A.2d 595, 598 (1969). 
See Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 672-73, 767 A.2d at 367. In analyzing the 
validity of the wrongful life cause of action under the tort framework, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland preyed on the failure of the Turpin 
court to "account fully and consistently for the fundamental flaw of the 
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Maryland court of appeals' analysis of the wrongful life cause of action 
may conform to the application of medical malpractice tort principles 
used when that court confronted wrongful conception and wrongful 
birth claims. 154 
Maryland's medical malpractice tort law supports a comprehensive 
standard of care, which describes the duty a physician owes to a pa-
tient.155 As developed through the common law, the duty of a physi-
cian to a patient also extends to the unborn child.156 As applied to 
the facts at issue in Kassama, and in accordance with the defendant's 
own testimony, if the trier of fact believed Mrs. Kassama's version of 
events-that she was not informed of the results of the AFP test or of 
her options to terminate the pregnancy-the defendant would have 
breached the duty of care. 157 
Following a breach of the duty of care, the plaintiff must then estab-
lish that such a breach caused, or proximately caused, the injury suf-
fered. 158 Maryland views this element broadly, employing the 
"substantial factor" test to determine causation.159 When viewed from 
the plaintiff child's position in a wrongful life claim, arguments pur-
porting to establish causation, injury and damages are tenuous.160 
The "substantial factor" analysis, however, enables the court to satisfy 
causation by recognizing the ability of the physician to circumvent lia-









wrongful life claim-the inability to make the required comparison be-
tween the plaintiffs actual condition and nonexistence." [d. (quoting Kur-
tis J. Kearl, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the Unsupportable Cause of Action for 
Wrongful Life, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1278 (1983». 
Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 232, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1993). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland demonstrates the need for consistency by 
adhering to the same tort principles applied in Jones v. Malinowski, when 
deciding whether or not to recognize wrongful birth claims in Reed v. 
Campagnolo. [d. 
As described by the court in Reed: 
A physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill 
which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the 
same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar cir-
cumstances. Under this standard, advances in the profession, avail-
ability of facilities, specialization or general practice, proximity of 
specialists and special facilities, together with all other relevant 
considerations, are to be taken into account. 
Reed, 332 Md. at 233,630 A.2d at 1148 (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emer-
gency Hosp., 276 Md. 187,200-01,349 A.2d 245, 253 (1975». 
Reed, 332 Md. at 233, 630 A.2d at 1148 (quoting Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 484-85, 187 A.2d 671, 673 (1963». 
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 650, 767 A.2d at 355. 
Reed, 332 Md. at 232-33, 630 A.2d at 1148. 
[d. at 240, 630 A.2d at 1152. Negligent conduct is the legal cause of injury if 
it is a "substantial factor" and the actor is not relieved from liability by rule 
of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). 
See supra Part II.B.2. 
See Reed, 332 Md. at 241,630 A.2d at 1152 (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 
432,438-39,379 A.2d, 1014, lO19 (1977) for the proposition that "the doc-
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Turning to the determination of damages, Maryland common law 
recognizes, as a general rule, that "a plaintiff may recover only those 
damages that are affirmatively proved with reasonable certainty to 
have resulted as the natural, proximate and direct effect of the tor-
tious misconduct."162 Maryland employs two principles, the doctrine 
of avoidable consequences163 and the benefit-offset rule,164 in the de-
termination of recoverable damages.165 As a matter of public policy 
and logic, the former is unlikely to bear on the calculation of damages 
in the context of a wrongful life claim.166 Yet, as demonstrated by 
certain jurisdictions adopting the majority position, special benefits 
conferred upon the plaintiff by the defendant's negligent conduct, 
namely the preciousness of life, may be considered in offsetting, or 
more to the extreme, nullifying, recoverable damages.167 
Furthermore, the purpose underlying the tort system of recovery is 
the notion that damages should be designed with the intention of re-
storing the injured party to the condition they would experience, but 
for the negligence of the tortfeasor. 168 Falling in line with the major-
ity of jurisdictions that have addressed wrongful life claims, the Court 
trine of informed consent imposes on a physician ... the duty to explain 
the procedure to the patient and to warn him of any material risks or dan-
gers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the patient to 
make an intelligent and informed choice."). 
162. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 269, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984). 
163. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 918 explains the doctrine of avoida-
ble consequences as follows: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), one injured by the tort of 
another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that 
he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or ex-
penditure after the commission of the tort. 
(2) One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular 
harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm 
or was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it, unless 
the injured person with knowledge of the danger of the harm 
intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1965). 
164. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 920 explains the benefit offset rule 
as follows: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the 
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special 
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of 
the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to 
the extent that this is equitable. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965). 
165. Jones, 299 Md. at 269, 473 A.2d at 435. 
166. See id. at 274, 473 A.2d at 437-38 (denying Dr. Jones' contentions that 
under the doctrine of avoidable consequences Mrs. Malinowski refusal to 
submit to an abortion, or place her daughter up for adoption should be 
considered when mitigating damages). 
167. See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (Mass. 1990); see also supra 
note 144 and accompanying text. 
168. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1993); Smith, 513 A.2d at 348; Nel-
son, 678 S.W.2d at 924-25. 
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of Special Appeals of Maryland found the calculation of damages im-
possible and thus fatal to the plaintiff's claim, as the comparison 
model, weighing nonexistence versus life in an impaired state, does 
not provide a standard for quantifying the value of the injury. 169 
E. How the Court of Appeals of Maryland Decided the Matter 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the 
lower court, yet determined ·the matter on the premise that life does 
not constitute a legal injury.170 The court's discussion of wrongful 
life, including wrongful conception and wrongful birth, begins by clas-
sifying the tort action at issue, reviewing related causes of action, and 
examining the Maryland case law that supports them. 171 Building a 
foundation for the holding, the court of appeals drew attention to the 
narrow language of Jones, which described the injury to the parents of 
a healthy child as the costs attendant with raising a child, not the child 
itself. 172 Further, the court distinguished the instant case from Reed, 
noting that in wrongful birth claims parents claim injuries of emo-
tional distress and child-raising expenses resulting from a medical 
provider's negligence;173 whereas, in this matter the defendant did 
not cause plaintiff's injury.174 
Continuing to frame its rationale, the court of appeals looked to 
two of the broad bases that sister jurisdictions have endorsed to invali-
date wrongful life claims: 1) that the damage calculation is too com-
plex; and 2) that the philosophical imponderable tied to the 
determination of whether an i~ury exists allows for varied results 
when left to the fact finder for resolution. 175 Further exploring these 
considerations, the court outlined the inadequacy of a damage rubric 
that purports to restore plaintiffs to the condition they would have 
experienced but for the claimed negligence when confronted with a 
169. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 675, 767 A.2d at 369. 
170. Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 149, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123-24 (2002); if. 
Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 675, 767 A.2d 348, 369 (2001) (invali-
dating a claim for wrongful life because of an inability to calculate 
damages). 
171. Kassama, 368 Md. at 134-37, 792 A.2d at 1114-16. The Maryland cases con-
sidered by the court in determining the wrongful life claim included Reed v. 
Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993) (validating a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful birth); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 
(1984) (recognizing claim for wrongful conception based on negligent ster-
ilization procedure); and Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417,79 A.2d 550 
(1951) (vesting a postnatal claim in both the child and parent for the negli-
gent infliction of prenatal injuries). 
172. Kassama, 368 Md. at 136, 792 A.2d at 1116; see also Jones v. Malinowski, 299 
Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435-36 (1984). 
173. Kassama, 368 Md. at 137, 792 A.2d at 1116. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 138, 792 A.2d at 1117. 
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comparison between life and nonexistence.176 More critical still, the 
court of appeals emphasized the inability of many jurisdictions to find 
a common law or statutory basis to recognize life as an injury. 177 
Of those states that have addressed the wrongful life issue through 
case law, two states' opinions figured prominently in Maryland's deter-
mination of the matter. 178 The Court of Appeals of Maryland pointed 
out Arizona's holding in Walker by Pizano v. Mart,179 which invalidated 
wrongful life from a fetal rights perspective, and New Hampshire's 
holding in Smith v. Cote,180 which discussed the public policy argu-
ments against recognizing wrongful life. 181 The Supreme Court of Ar-
izona reasoned that while the physician's duty of care extended to the 
fetus, the fetus did not have a right to be born or the ability to deter-
mine matters related to birth.182 As such, "any wrong ... [committed 
is] a wrong to the parents, not the fetus."183 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also noted New Hampshire's elu-
cidation of several public policy arguments against recognizing wrong-
ful life in Smith v. Cote. 184 In that case, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire considered whether the judiciary was competent to decide 
the value of life, determining that courts should not get involved in 
deciding the worth of a person's life. 185 Further, the court feared vali-
dating wrongful life claims would: "disparage the dignity of the dis-
abled," and that the "subjective and intensely personal notions as to 
the intangible value of life" considered by juries would create dispa-
rate outcomes. 186 
Turning to the minority states-California, Washington and New 
Jersey-the Court of Appeals of Maryland scrutinized the reasoning 
by which these states validated a limited cause of action for wrongful 
life.187 The court found the determination of damages significant, to 
the extent that each of the minority jurisdictions agreed with the ma-
jority position that a general damage award was impossible to recog-
nize. 188 This commonality supports Maryland's holding - not to 
176. See id. at 138-40, 792 A.2d at 1117-18 (recounting the treatment of a wrong-
fullife claim and inability to award damages by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (NJ. 1967)). 
177. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 140, 792 A.2d at 1118. 
178. See id. at 142-43, 792 A.2d at 1120. 
179. 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990). 
180. 513 A.2d 341, 352-54 (N.H. 1986). 
181. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 142-43, 792 A.2d at 1120. 
182. Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739-40 (Ariz. 1990). 
183. Id. at 740. In this context, the injury resulting from the alleged wrong is 
"the inability of the parents to terminate the pregnancy which, in turn, re-
sulted in the child being born." Kassama, 368 Md. at 143, 792 A.2d at 1120. 
184. Kassama, 368 Md. at 143, 792 A.2d at 1120 (citing Smith, 513 A.2d at 352-
54). 
185. Smith, 513 A.2d at 355. 
186. Id. 
187. Kassama, 368 Md. at 144-48, 792 A.2d at 1120-23. 
188. Id. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123. 
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recognize wrongful life claims - in as much as the accord unifies all 
jurisdictions and enables the court to characterize the distinction be-
tween the positions as whether legal reasoning or emotion serves as 
the basis for judgment.189 The Court of Appeals of Maryland went on 
to state that injury cannot be predicated on emotion; instead, finding 
an injury requires a reasoned basis, without which, a determination of 
damages becomes moot.190 Thus presented, the court echoed the 
criticismsl9l of sister jurisdictions such as Arizonal92 and New Hamp-
shire l93 and held that "for the purposes of tort law, an impaired life is 
not worse than non-life, and, for that reason, life is not, and cannot be, 
an injury."194 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Maryland Should Have Recognized the Wrongful Life Cause of Action 
The Maryland judiciary, drawing support from the statutory scheme 
and common law, should have recognized the wrongful life cause of 
action, at least in limited circumstances. The cause of action arising 
from the same set of facts, yet owned by the parents,195 should inure 
to the child when the parents are not available to sue.196 Further-
more, recognition of the child's wrongful life claim would alleviate 
the financial burden the child is faced with in terms of the cost of life-
long medical care and maintenance. 
B. lVhy the Court Should Have Recognized the Wrongful Life Cause of 
Action 
Recognition of the wrongful life cause of action would satisfY the 
social aims of the tort system, remedy statutory pitfalls, and meet the 
ever-increasing legal obligations concomitant with advancements in 
genetic counseling and medical technology. "Tort recovery is de-
signed, inter alia, to prevent an injured party from becoming destitute 
and a burden upon innocent third parties."197 This policy necessarily 
189. See id. 
190. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123. 
191. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 144, 792 A.2d at 1120. Arizona, New Hampshire 
and other states criticized the minority position for permitting the child to 
recover special damages but not general damages-placing significance on 
emotional notions of fairness rather than logic. Id. 
192. The Supreme Court of Arizona invalidated the wrongful life cause of action 
in Walker fry Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. 1990). 
193. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire invalidated wrongful life claims in 
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 355 (N.H. 1986). 
194. Id. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123. 
195. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
196. See Tuprin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762; Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983). 
197. Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 111 Md. App. 49, 71, 680 A.2d 532, 543 
(1996) . 
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demands solvent tortfeasors share in the financial burden resulting 
from their negligent conduct.198 Additionally, as a principle well es-
tablished in the common law, tort recovery deters negligent 
conduct. 199 
As demonstrated by the minority jurisdictions, application of the 
traditional tort framework results in a valid cause of action for wrong-
fullife. 20o Where an injury is identifiable, damages may be awarded in 
tort to "restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the position 
he or she would have been in had the wrong not been done."201 The 
award of damages should be limited to those that flow proximately 
from the negligent conduct and are readily ascertainable.202 Though 
the award of general damages, encompassing compensation for pain 
and suffering, is not amenable to rational determination or "fair, non-
speculative" calculation,203 other types of damages proximately caused 
by third party negligence-special damages-are not only readily as-
certainable, but regularly awarded in professional malpractice 
cases.204 
Recognition of wrongful life as a valid cause of action would remedy 
gaps and pitfalls within the existing statutory scheme.205 At present, 
Maryland statutory law obligates parents to provide for destitute adult 
children.206 The primary purpose of this obligation is "to remove 
from public support destitute and disabled people whose relatives are 
financially able to support them."207 This responsibility, while an obvi-
198. See id. 
199. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 764; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496. 
200. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 960; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 
488. 
201. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961. 
202. See id. at 963-64. 
203. [d. The court in Turpin concedes that the fact finder, being human, is not 
competent to "determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the 
plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than 
not being born." [d. at 963. Further, the court acknowledges the impossi-
bility of determining the value of general damages in a "fair, nonspecula-
tive manner." [d. Explaining by way of analogy, the court established that 
the ability to valuate the difference between an infirm life and nonexis-
tence is not parallel to determining the value of a broken arm, as the latter 
is within the realm of human experience and imagination, and the former 
is not. [d. at 963-64. 
204. [d. at 965. Special damages represent the cost of the child's "present and 
~ontinui~g need for such special, extraordinary medical care and train-
mg .... [d. 
205. See supra Part II.D. 
206. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (1999). 
207. Freeburger v. Bichell, 135 Md. App. 680, 692, 763 A.2d 1226, 1232 (2000) 
(holding that section 13-102(b) of the Maryland Family Law Article does 
not give rise to an independent cause of action in the parent against the 
tortfeasor who caused the adult child's disability). 
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ous and rightful promotion of family values, holds the potential to 
financially ruin a family. 208 
Under Jones v. Malinowski,209 parents may only recover damages up 
to the age of majority on a claim of wrongful conception.210 Though 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized wrongful birth as a valid 
cause of action in Reed v. Campagnolo,211 the court did not extend re-
covery beyond the age of majority.212 Furthermore, only parents may 
recover for wrongful birth.213 In addition, the common law rule of 
Freeburger denies a cause of action in tort under section 13-102 (b) of 
the Maryland Family Law Article in favor of the caretaker of a desti-
tute disabled person against a third party tortfeasor.214 Thus, a fur-
ther concern assuaged by the recognition of a claim for wrongful life 
is the need for a parent to be available to bring a wrongful birth cause 
of action in order to recover damages and defray the costs of ongoing 
medical care.215 In this vein, the wrongful life cause of action not only 
guarantees a mechanism by which the child may allay the extraordi-
nary cost of a lifetime of medical care; the cause of action also protects 
the child from parents absconding damages recovered from their own 
wrongful birth claim, or who may breach the fiduciary relationship 
created therein; or who may simply be unavailable to bring a cause of 
action for wrongful birth.216 
Paramount in the discussion of whether or not to recognize a cause 
of action for wrongful life is proper allocation of the exorbitant cost of 
living for disabled persons. Currently, the common law only provides 
for damages to be awarded to the parents.217 Moreover, these reme-
dies only compensate the injured party until the child obtains the age 
of majority, leaving the disabled individual without financial support 
as an adult. 218 In the face of lifetime medical care, this inadequacy 
exposes the legally obligated family to bankruptcy,219 a second harm 
visited upon the family already suffering from the emotional heart-
ache of raising a child with a genetic disorder. A growing uninsured 
208. "A 1998 survey conducted by the National Commission on Orphan Diseases 
revealed that in nearly half of the cases studied, the existence of a heredi-
tary disorder caused the patient or care-giver relative financial hardship, 
due in part to inadequate medical insurance." David T. Morris, Notes and 
Comments, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic 
Screening and the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM. J.L.& MED. 295, 
298 (1994). 
209. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984). 
210. Id. at 270, 473 A.2d at 435. 
211. 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993). 
212. See id. at 238, 630 A.2d at 1151. 
213. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
214. Freeburger, 135 Md. App. at 682-83, 763 A.2d at 1227. 
215. See Smith, 513 A.2d at 355. 
216. See Walker try Pizano, 790 P.2d at 741. 
217. See supra notes 9, 84-87, 215 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. 
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population22o further compounds the financial burden left by com-
mon law remedies. In addition, public assistance health plans that 
sacrifice much needed medical benefits in the name of politics,221 are 
not helpful when "persons affected by genetic disease are often 
among the class of individuals who ... are least likely to be able to 
obtain [medical insurance] ."222 In the event that the parents are una-
ble to provide such care, the child will necessarily become the respon-
sibility of the state.223 
Yet another reason to recognize the wrongful life cause of action 
speaks to advancements in genetic counseling and medical technol-
ogy.224 Increased knowledge of the human genome holds the poten-
tial "to isolate and successfully alter the genetic make-up of embryo 
cells, thus curing genetic disorders."225 Such capability will likely cause 
many jurisdictions in the majority to change position and recognize 
modified wrongful life claims, as the causal link between the doctor's 
negligence and the child's impairment will be firmly established.226 
Additionally, jurisdictions rejecting the claim due to the impossibility 
of calculating damages may likely change position as the impaired life 
versus non-life comparison will be replaced with a comparison "be-
tween life with a genetic disorder and life without a genetic 
disorder. "227 
At the same time knowledge increases, so too the standard of care 
. owed to patients will increase.228 Though the same community stan-
dard may slow this evolution, the judiciary will not condone class neg-
ligence.229 While many courts acknowledge the potential for scientific 
. advancements to impact the current state of the law, few jurisdictions 
make more than casual reference to such considerations, and none 
220. David T. Morris, Notes and Comments, Cost Containment and Reproductive 
Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of 
1993, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 298 (1994). 
22l. The Hyde Amendment, 42 U.S.CA section 1396 (West 1992), denies abor-
tion benefits under Medicaid except when the life of the mother is in dan-
ger. See also Morris, supra note 220, at 298. 
222. Morris, supra note 220, at 298. 
223. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
225. Thomas A. Warnock, Scientific Advancements: Will Technology Make the Unpop-
ular Wrongful Birth/Life Causes of Action Extinct?, 19 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. 
J. 173, 184 (2001). 
226. [d.; see also supra note 2l. 
227. Warnock, supra note 225, at 184. 
228. See id. at 185. 
229. See id. "If a community of professionals continues to employ outdated prac-
tices, the courts reserve the authority to declare the entire group negli-
gent." [d. 
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find such arguments persuasive enough to validate wrongful life 
claims.230 
C. Shortcomings 
The greatest obstacle to recognizing a cause of action for wrongful 
life lies in the great weight accorded public policy in the resolution of 
the issue.231 The weight of public policy is perhaps most forceful in 
those jurisdictions rejecting wrongful life due to the impossibility of 
calculating damages; an inability often addressed in metaphysical 
terms.232 The essence of the wrongful life claim touches sacrosanct 
tenets of human existence embodied in the common law as the 
preciousness of human life.233 Yet, this policy also bears weakness. 
The notion that mere existence carries with it an indeterminate bene-
fit is individually inspired. For there is no benefit when one cannot 
conceive, cannot process, cannot comprehend or cannot act to enjoy 
one's own existence.234 
A further weakness expressed by some majority jurisdictions is a 
readiness to defer decision of the matter to the legislature.235 Major-
ity jurisdictions ultimately reject wrongful life claims; yet do so as a 
conservative course of action begging legislative guidance.236 Adding 
to the weakness of the majority position, lack of uniform rationale and 
230. See Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 548; Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abel-
son, 398 S.E.2d 557, 566 (Ga. 1990) (Benham,]., dissenting); Greco, 893 
P.2d at 354 (Shearing,]. and Rose,]. concurring and dissenting). 
231. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697. The court stated in Siemieniec. 
[d. 
Resting on the belief that human life, no matter how burdened, is, 
as a matter of law, always preferable to nonlife, me courts have 
been reluctant to find that the infant has sUffered a legally cogniza-
ble injury by being born with a congenital or genetic impairment as 
opposed to not being born at all. 
232. The Becker court expressed the difficulty of calculating damages as follows: 
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have 
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly 
to be left to the philosophers and theologians. Surely the law can 
assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of 
the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has 
placed on human life, rather than its absence. 
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812; See also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 
1992); Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697; Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 
641 (Kan. 1986). 
233. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697; Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 641; see also supra 
notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
234. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 963. 
235. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 
1025. 
236. Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 1025. The court stated" [i] n our view, the question is a 
matter of public policy. While courts routinely attempt to resolve public 
policy issues, some issues are clearly more appropriate for legislative consid-
eration than judicial treatment." [d. 
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strong dissents keep the wrongful life issue from finding secure 
footing. 237 
Not the least of the shortcomings involved with the issue of wrong-
ful life are future considerations, namely advancements in medicine, 
genetic engineering, and related fields that compound the pressure 
for recognition of the claim.238 By nature, the judicial system is, in 
part, reactive; deciding questions of law derived from events in the 
past. Yet, to an extent, the pace at which the judiciary lags behind 
scientific advancements can be controlled.239 "[A]s ... science 
presses forward, researchers and the public must be prepared to grap-
ple with the gamut of ethical, legal, societal, scientific, and medical 
issues."24o The wrongful life cause of action presents the judiciary 
with the unique opportunity to meet the legal progeny of medical 
trends in a timely manner, thus avoiding the pressure of heated 
debate.241 
v. CONCLUSION 
The wrongful life cause of action remains in the spotlight of judicial 
debate as, one by one,jurisdictions decide whether or not the claim is 
valid.242 Although a significant number of states reject the claim,243 
they do so shackled by public policy and in the face of vehement dis-
sents often revealing a narrowly dividedjudiciary.244 Those states rep-
resenting the minority position validate a limited cause of action.245 
Conceding the difficulty in adequately determining general damages, 
minority jurisdictions allow recovery only for special damages, stand-
237. The following cases adopting the majority position, invalidating wrongful 
life claims, include dissenting opinions: Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 
1202 (Colo. 1988); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1985); Siemieniec 
v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 
S.w.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Ellis 
v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v. KruSen, 678 S.W.2d 918 
(Tex. 1984); DurneY v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.w.2d 372 (Wis. 1975). 
238. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 932 (Kilgarlin,]., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
239. See id. (stating "[d]espite the rapidly expanding impact of genetic knowl-
edge upon our society, the law has failed to keep pace . . . . [0] nly by 
assuring a doctor's legal accountability can we guard against an abuse of 
such power."). 
240. Gwen Moulton, Panel Finds in Utero Gene Therapy Pmposal Is Premature, 91]. 
NAT'L CANCER INsT. 407 (1999). 
24l. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 566 
(Ga. 1990) (Benham,]., dissenting) ("If we are to maintain the proper bal-
ance between law and medicine, we cannot allow the law to be determined 
in the laboratory; but we would be derelict in our duty if we failed to take 
into consideration developments in the laboratory."). 
242. See supra Part ILB. 
243. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 230, 237, 239 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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ing on tort principles that recognize the need to defray the extraordi-
nary cost of ongoing medical care and training borne by plaintiffs as a 
result of the negligence of a solvent tortfeasor.246 
Maryland's common law and statutory scheme provide for recogni-
tion of a limited cause of action for wrongful life.247 Such a claim 
would circumvent the dangers inherent in allowing recovery only to 
parents under a wrongful birth cause of action.248 Additionally, a 
wrongful life claim would alleviate the need to separately address a 
cause of action for post-majority damages, allowing the child to re-
cover damages not claimed by, or awarded to parents, should they 
bring a wrongful birth claim.249 Furthermore, wrongful life claims 
avoid the pitfalls of a statutory scheme that hold the potential to bank-
rupt already burdened families by obliging them to provide care and 
financial support to destitute adult children.25o Such a claim may also 
provide the financial means necessary to avoid state involvement in 
the management and care of individuals born into an existence they 
can neither afford nor escape.251 Finally, by recognizing a cause of 
action for wrongful life, courts have an opportunity to stem the tide of 
legal claims that flow from advances in medicine and genetics. 252 
Though the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to recognize a 
child plaintiff's claim for wrongful life, the matter remains unsettled. 
The court's holding in Kassama v. Magaf53 side-steps two crucial is-
sues lying at the heart of the wrongful life debate: How will the child's 
needs be met when she obtains majority status? And who will meet 
these needs? At present, this responsibility lies primarily on the par-
ents.254 Should the parents be unable to adequately provide for their 
disabled child, however, the state will necessarily become involved.255 
Meanwhile, the tortfeasor, whose proven negligence results in liability 
only for pre-majority damages,256 is released from an obligation under 
tort law to remedy a harm. Contrary to the tort remedy provided by 
the court's recognition of wrongful birth claims in Reed v. 
246. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra Part I1.D. 
248. See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes lOl-02, 206-09 and accompanying text. In the alternative, an 
expansion of the Reed holding to allow parents to recover post-majority 
damages under a claim of wrongful birth would, in part, remedy the child's 
claim. 
250. See supra notes 208-lO and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text. 
253. 368 Md. 113, 792 A.2d 1102 (2002). 
254. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
256. For the purposes of this argument, suppose the parents of a disabled child 
successfully brought a wrongful birth claim against the mother's Obstetri-
cian/ Gynecologist. 
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Campagnolo,257 however, the harm does not cease upon attainment of 
majority status, but rather continues for the life of the child. 
Perhaps the solution to this problem calls for an expansion of the 
existing common law rules taken from Jones v. Malinowski and Reed, 
allowing parents to recover post-majority damages.258 Yet, this too falls 
short of securing the financial resources needed to care for the now 
disabled adult in the event that the parents are not able to bring a 
wrongful birth claim. 
Finally, another tack may yield an answer. The court's holding in 
Damasiewicz v. GorSUCh,259 allowing child plaintiffs to recover damages 
for prenatal torts, evokes family law arguments that focus on the right 
of the child to access the court, relative to the rights of the parents.260 
In this vein, however, circuitous logic may prove fatal, leading the ju-
diciary to again confront a child's claim in the face of a mother's right 
to determine matters of pregnancy and birth.261 
T. Brendan Kennedy 
257. 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993); see supra Part II.C.3. 
258. See supra Part II.C.2-3. 
259. 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951). 
260. See supra Part II.C.l. 
261. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
